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ABSTRACT 
While e-procurement auction has helped firms to achieve lower 
procurement costs, auction mechanisms that prevail at present in 
procurement markets need to address an important issue that 
concerns the ability to maintain long term relationships with the 
partners, especially in repeated e-procurement settings. In this 
paper, we propose a Relationship Preserving Auction (RPA) 
mechanism that augments the conventional auction mechanism 
with a bidder relationship scoring model. Our proposed 
mechanism gives increased chances of winning to the bidders 
who have bidden at relatively competitive price but had 
comparatively less wins so far. Keeping these bidders in the 
auction over time will lead to more competitive bidding prices 
and eventually reduce the auctioneer’s total procurement cost in 
repeated auctions. From simulation experiments, we show how 
RPA works under different bidders' behavior. We show that RPA 
is able to obtain lower procurement cost compared 
to conventional procurement auctions when bidders bid 
opportunistically and renege readily to other markets.  
 
Keywords: Supplier relationship, e-procurement, auction 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
E-procurement auctions are increasingly being used in B2B 
sourcing activities. Virtually every major industry has begun to 
utilize auctions for procurement on a regular basis. The increasing 
usage of e-procurement auction is based on two key factors. The 
first is that e-procurement auction creates financial savings for 
buying companies. These auctions have tended to produce 
typically 15% cost savings (Cohn 2000).  
 
The second factor influencing their rapid growth is the process 
efficiencies that auctions create. E-procurement auction reduces 
procurement time dramatically from 6 weeks to several hours (Jap 
2002). 
In forging long term contracts between buyers and sellers, 
partnerships have long been considered as the most appropriate 
strategy (Cousins, 1999; Burnes and New, 1997). In recent years, 
market mechanisms have emerged to be an attractive alternative. 
For example, Forker and Stannock (2000) demonstrated that there 
can be a better understanding between buyer and supplier in the 
‘competitive’ exchange, and that market mechanisms may be a 
better method of satisfying the needs of contracting firms in many 
buying situations. As e-commerce grows, buyer’s supply sources 
can be extended by adding more competition, with less additional 
transaction cost to the buyer (Clemons et al. 1993, Smart and 
Harrison 2003). Hence, we see the increased potential to use 
market mechanism such as auctions in the long term procurement 
market.  
Although the wide adoption of current e-procurement auction has 
helped firms to obtain lower cost procurements, it has also raised 
important issues related to the ability to maintain long-term 
relationships with the partners in the supply chain. Hence, for 
auctions to be long sustaining, we argue that it is vital that the 
mechanism takes into consideration the aspect of relationship 
preservation. The meaning of relationship in auction market is 
different from its traditional meaning in SCM literature.  The 
meaning of relationship in auction is restricted only between 
auctioneer and bidders in regard to the auction related activities. 
Especially, maintaining long term relationship with bidders is 
necessary in repeated auctions with same bidders after the initial 
contract period. In this case, suppliers should be selected not 
solely on the basis of price but a multi attribute selection criterion 
like quality, reliability, and congruency with business goal (Daly 
and Nath 2005). Furthermore, to be a sustainable auction 
mechanism in repeated purchasing, the mechanism needs to help 
the auctioneer to maintain enough bidders for competitive bidding 
price over time (Smart and Harrison 2003). Keeping enough 
number of bidders are critical to lower the bidding price and 
eventually the procurement cost for auctioneer (Tenorio, 1993). 
Therefore, to design successful auction mechanism for repeated e-
procurement market by considering relationship with bidders, 
there are two key factors: 
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that 
copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on 
the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers 
or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a 
fee. 
10th Int. Conf. on Electronic Commerce (ICEC) ’08 Innsbruck, Austria 
Copyright 2008 ACM 978-1-60558-075-3/08/08 ...$5.00. 
• Fair bidder assessment: we need to assess the bidders based on 
not only price but also quality, delivery time, reliability and 
their involvement 
• Sufficient number of bidders: we need to maintain relationship 
with sufficient number of bidder in order to have competitive 
bidding price over repeated auctions. 
The auction mechanism considering these two factors can 
increase the procurement cost for auctioneer in short term, but it 
will reduce the cost eventually in long term. Many researches for 
the fair bidder assessment have been done in Multi-attribute 
auction area. But research attempts for the second factor have 
been found rarely in auction studies. Hence, we mainly focus on 
designing auction mechanism helps to maintain enough bidders 
over repeated auctions in this research.  
In this paper, we propose the notion of a Relationship Preserving 
Auction (RPA) which embeds attributes aimed at preserving long 
term relationship with enough number of competitive bidders in 
repeated auctions. To take into consideration of the relationship in 
auction mechanism design, we devised relationship scoring model 
for bidders based on their bidding behaviors and auction history. 
The relationship score provides greater winning opportunity to 
bidders who have bidden competitively but have not managed to 
win in previous auctions. Under this proposed mechanism, the 
buyer (or synonymously, auctioneer) can retain enough bidders to 
participate in the auction at competitive prices, while bidders will 
remain long enough in the system to be able to obtain a share of 
the revenue through successful bidding. We will show 
experimentally how RPA reaps the benefits arising from 
preserving relationship with bidders in repeated auction by 
comparing with other auction mechanisms under varying bidders’ 
behavior. 
 The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In section 2, 
we review related studies from various auction areas and supplier 
relationship management. In section 3, we set target market for 
our proposed mechanism. Descriptions of RPA are followed in 
section 4. In section 5, the experiment settings are explained and 
results are summarized with discussions. In section 6, we 
conclude by discussing the limitation of current works and the 
direction of future studies.  
 
2. RELATED STUDIES 
A typical auction is an economic mechanism for determining the 
price of an item in a one time transaction. In a corporate 
procurement setting, price is not a sufficient criterion to assess 
suppliers. Some researchers attempt to include not only price but 
also multiple attributes such as quality and delivery accuracy so 
as to evaluate suppliers more rigorously. Multi attribute auction 
mechanism contributes to evaluate bidders in multi dimensions, 
but still focusing on one-time purchase rather than long term 
relationship procurement (Martin Bichler et al.  1999).  
Some researches have allowed multiple items in one auction. 
Auctions where bidders are allowed to submit bids on 
combination of items are called combinatorial auction (Peked and 
Rothkopf 2003). Combinatorial auction has recently received 
much attention in various area such as spectrum selling 
(McMillan 1994), airport time slot allocation (Rassenti et al. 
1982), transportation auction (Seffi 2004) and even in 
procurement (Hohner 2003)., Combinatorial auction allows 
bidders to express its preference more precisely and allocates 
multiple items more efficiently in one time auction.  
Often in procurement, preserving long term relationships between 
buyers and suppliers is a critical success factor for both sides 
(Grey et al. 2005). Many scholars and practitioners are reaching a 
consensus around a trade off between the value and benefits of 
gaining lower prices versus losing long term relationship with 
suppliers. Daly and Nath (2005) for instance suggested that the 
auction design can be more conductive to long term investments 
and relationships by subsidizing relational partners, making 
payments for losing bidders, even re-negotiating final contract bid 
prices and specifications. While their study is conceptual, what is 
needed is a more concrete methodology for designing and 
implementing relationship-centric auction mechanisms so as to 
tangibly demonstrate and reap the benefits arising from 
preserving long term relationship in repeated procurement 
auctions.  
Lee and Szymanski (2006) used an incentive mechanism to keep 
enough bidders in a forward auction market. They proposed 
Optimal Recurring Auction (ORA) for e-service markets with 
multiple units and multiple winners. The auction mechanism 
considers not only price but also incentive score. They compare 
their auction mechanism with uniform price auction empirically 
and their results shows that keeping enough bidders is important 
even in recurrent forward e-service auctions. While their 
assumptions are somewhat unrealistic in generating experimental 
settings and data, the approach itself is quite interesting.  
The impact of number of bidders on auction performance has 
been studied in auction research. McAfee and McMillan (1987) 
suggested that knowledge about the number of bidders and their 
bidding behavior matters in various auction mechanism and its 
results. Harstad et al. (1990) showed that each bidder selects his 
bid effectively knowing the number of rivals he faces in 
contingent bidding.  
Airco Company’s auction case (Smart and Harrison (2003)) 
shows that Airco achieved 30% reduction on its stationery 
procurement from the first auction which were far in excess of 
their expectation. This result is affected not only by adopting 
auction per se, but also other important factors which arise from 
the previous contract conditions and new entry of competitive 
suppliers. They reported that the previous contracts had been with 
the same supplier for 10 years and had not been put out to tender 
during that period. The situation turned around when several new 
suppliers have entered this market and supply in quite competitive 
price. The authors emphasized that to maintain such price impact 
by auction in subsequent contracts, keeping enough competitive 
bidders is critical (more so than adopting auction itself).  
Hao (2000) presented key factors affecting an opportunistic 
bidding strategy: the cost distribution of all bidders, market 
demand, and the number of bidders participating in the auction. 
Experimentally, he shows that when the number of bidders 
increases, the probability of being on the margin and winning the 
auction is reduced and the bidding price will be reduced 
accordingly. Hence, in repeated procurement markets, 
maintaining enough number of competitive bidders is critical for 
buyer to reduce cost by auctions. 
In supplier relationship management (SRM) studies, the 
importance of relationship with suppliers and the strategy to 
 
develop the relationship have been discussed substantially. 
Krause et al. (2000) mentioned four key activities to develop the 
relationship with suppliers: supplier incentives, supplier 
assessment, competitive pressure and direct involvement. In the 
context of auction mechanism design, we consider that bidder 
incentives based on its assessment through auctions can be 
adopted as an additional feature to encourage and retain long term 
relationship with suppliers.  
 
3. TARGET MARKET ANALSYSIS   
To classify our target market, we use two criteria; purchasing 
volume and purchasing frequency. Generally speaking, auction is 
suited for items with high purchasing volume which attracts many 
bidders to join and compete on price. The other criterion often 
neglected is the purchasing frequency where we argue that the 
auction mechanism needs to handle relationships when auction 
occurs repetitively and frequently. Figure 1 shows our target 
market position as well as recommended procurement strategy for 
each cell at the current market.  
 
Figure 1. Target market classification 
 
The upper left quadrant represents most manufacturing settings, 
where manufacturing companies open auctions for an item with 
high purchasing volume, but the frequency is very low. Our target 
market is the high purchasing volume with high frequency (upper 
right quadrant) which can be readily found in procurement 
outsourcing companies.  
Procurement outsourcing company form groups of buyers of 
particular products or commodities within specific vertical or 
horizontal markets. By aggregating the buying power of multiple 
customer buyers, the procurement outsourcing company becomes 
a single virtual buyer with large enough volume to purchase and 
open auction frequently for the same item as required by her 
customer buyers. A buyer can often reap economies of scale and 
reduce its transaction cost by outsourcing their procurement to the 
procurement outsourcing company. Everest research (2007) 
reports that procurement outsourcing companies have grown 
rapidly and procurement outsourcing market grew to U.S. $40 in 
managed spend in 2006. In addition, buyers for an outsourcing 
company have realized sourcing-related savings of 5-20%. A 
vertical procurement outsourcing company pursues this buyer 
aggregation / purchasing outsourcing strategy in manufacturing 
inputs. For example, FOB.com pursues this strategy in chemicals; 
BizBuyer.com, PurchasingCenter.com and iMarketKorea are a 
few of many firms pursuing this strategy in horizontal markets 
(MRO procurement).  
In this context, the procurement outsourcing company 
(auctioneer) opens multiple auctions for the same item because it 
has multiple customers with various demand curves. The buyer 
and suppliers are loosely coupled in the sense that suppliers will 
readily renege and move to another market if they do not derive 
enough revenues from the current market. From the procurement 
outsourcing company point of view, he needs to maintain enough 
suppliers in the auction so as to solicit competitive price bidding 
arising from competition among suppliers. The e-procurement 
auction mechanism we propose can help the procurement 
outsourcing company to maintain bidding price competitiveness 
in repeated auction by keeping enough number of bidders.  
Our target auction problem is based on the typical single-shot first 
price sealed bid reverse auctions in a repeated procurement 
environment. We assume that there is a single buyer who is 
interested to procure a single item from multiple suppliers. The 
item is either a standardized or semi-standardized product. 
Multiple suppliers are invited to bid to supply multiple units of 
the item and only one winner will be assigned in one auction. The 
auctioneer and bidders are loosely coupled and bidders can drop 
out of the auction market if they cannot make enough revenue 
after certain number of auction participations 
We make the following assumptions to simplify our study; 
• The number of participants in an auction is known to all 
bidders 
o Most auctions models assume the number of bidders is 
common knowledge (Harstad et al. 1990) 
o Where these assumptions are not valid, it is often possible 
to make use of the best estimate or historical data to 
substitute the data assumed (Hao 2000). 
• The set of bidders is pre-determined from the onset, and new 
bidders are not allowed to join in the ongoing repeated auctions  
• A bidder is involved in every auction until he drops out of the 
repeated procurement environment.. 
 
4. RELATIONSHIP PRESERVING 
AUCTION (RPA) MECHANISM 
The purpose of our proposed Relationship Preserving Auction is 
to maintain enough bidders for continuous competitive bidding 
price over repeated auctions. The  goal is to help the auctioneer to 
reduce the procurement cost in long term eventually. For this 
purpose, we pick winners based on not only price but also 
relationship score calculated based on bidders’ bidding history. 
Intuitively, the basic idea in relationship score is to give a higher 
score to a bidder whose bidding price was competitive enough but 
did not win in previous auctions. This score will give a higher 
chance to win for bidders whose bidding price is not the lowest at 
the current auction but has been relatively competitive in previous 
auctions to prevent bidders dropping out of the auction. To 
maintain efficient procurement auctions, the losing bidders must 
be kept interested and able to compete for future auctions (Daly 
and Nath 2005). Thus both price and relationship score are then 
considered in the winner determination process.  
 
 
4.1 Relationship Scoring Model 
 
There are n bidders, denoted by i=1,…,n. Each bidder enters the 
bidding price b1, b2,…,, bn, respectively in each auction. There are 
m auctions, denoted by j=1,…,m.  bij denotes bidder i’s bidding 
price in the jth auction and nj denotes the number of bidder 
participating in the jth auction. 
We propose the following relationship scoring model which is 
aimed at rewarding bidder i in the jth auction based on its bidding 
prices and auction results in previous auctions using the following 
relationship score Sij:         
 
                            (1) 
 
Bij denotes bidder i's relative bidding price competitiveness until 
jth auctions. Hence, Bij  is the cumulative value of bidder i’s price 
competitiveness compared to all remaining bidders’ sum of 
average price competitiveness until auction j. We use just 
cumulative value of bidder’s price competitiveness rather than 
average term in the numerator to reflect the changes in bidding 
price auction by auction more. It is defined as follow for each 
bidder i in kth auction; 
 
 
 
 
Where f(bij) represents the Price Competitiveness (PC) transfer 
function. We set the price competitiveness based on each bidder’s 
bidding price. Basically, the function gives a higher value to a 
lower bidding price. Furthermore, price competitiveness values 
for the bidding prices increase slowly as the price decreases, 
where bidding price is lower than certain point (termed as the 
turning point price) which is decided by auctioneer (for example, 
10 in Figure 2). On the other hand, the price competitiveness 
value for the bidding price higher than certain point will be 
decrease rapidly. Figure 2 shows example of price 
competitiveness transfer function used in our experiment in 
section 5.  
 
Figure 2. Example of price competitiveness transfer function 
 
Second term in equation (1), Wij stands for the bidder i’s rewards 
from auctions until auction j. Hence, Wij represents simply the 
cumulative number of wins for bidder i until j-1th auction in our 
model. It is defined as follow in kth auction; 
 
 
The coefficient α in equation (1) controls the value of Wij and its 
value is always negative in order to give more winning chances to 
bidders who have not been winning. If α is set as a more negative 
value, our scoring model gives more weight in Wij and finally 
bidders who have yet to win for a long time will have a higher 
chance to win with their higher score, vice versa.  
The  relationship score Sij of a bidder i in the auction j represents 
the bidder i’s difference between the cumulated relative 
competitiveness of bidding price and the number of wins until the 
jth auctions. Hence, our bidder relationship scoring model is 
based on the insight that gives higher score to the bidder who has 
bidden relatively competitive bidding price but comparatively less 
wins so far. We argue that this kind of bidder has high possibility 
to drop out of future auctions.  
ijijij WBS α+
 
4.2 Winner Determination 
In winner determination, we consider not only the bidders’ 
bidding price but also the scores obtained from relationship 
scoring model, thereby resulting in a winner determination 
problem with two criteria. There are well-studied approaches to 
solve multiple criteria optimization problems, for example in 
evaluating and selecting suppliers (Weber and Desai 1996, Talluri 
and Ragatz 2004, Beil and Wein 2003). In this study, we propose 
a winner determination algorithm based on a very general multi 
criteria decision making paradigm Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978, Webber 1996).   
In our winner determination algorithm, we choose a single winner 
based on two inputs; the bidder’s bidding price and its 
relationship score. First, we identify an efficient Pareto frontier  
which includes bidders who dominate other bidders from the 
observed inputs.  Then, to assign the winner among the Pareto 
frontier, we apply an addictive model. Our winner determination 
algorithm is presented as follows: 
 
[Winner determination algorithm] 
Step 1. Find the Pareto efficient frontier and let the number of 
bidders on this frontier in auction j be nj*  
Step 2. Compare nj* with 1(single winner) 
            2.1 if nj* > 1, go to Step 3  
            2.2 if nj* = 1, go to Step 4 
Step 3. Select the winner among the nj* bidders with the highest 
value Uij (defined as follows) and go to Step 4. 
 
 
 
Step 4. Return the winner assignment result and stop. 
 
Step 3 gives the formula to pick the winner among the Pareto 
frontier, where β is relative weight for bidding price against 
relationship score. Uij is thus the weighted average of the 
normalized associated bidding price and score for each bidder i in 
auction j. In our experiments (presented in Section 5), we will 
analyze the impact of various β values on the auction results. 
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5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
In this section, we show how our Relationship Preserving Auction 
mechanism with bidder relationship scoring model and proposed 
winner determination algorithm works in various situations 
compared to other procurement auction mechanism prevailing in 
the market. The experiment in this paper is at the preliminary 
stage and the generated experiment data is based on empirical 
study from iMarketKorea which is procurement outsourcing 
company in Korea and our several assumptions. From the 
experiment results, we show the circumstances in which our 
proposed mechanism performs better than the conventional 
approach. Empirical validation for the experiment data and results 
will be needed in future studies.  
 
5.1 Comparison Experiment Design 
To compare our proposed auction mechanism with other 
approaches, we will use two comparison criteria; 
• The auctioneer’s total cost of procurement within the 
procurement time horizon with multiple auctions 
• The number of bidders remaining in the last auction 
We design the comparison experiments based on two factors; 
auction type and with/without bidder drop-out, as summarized in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison experiment design 
 
RPA is not applicable in market which bidder never drops. More 
explanations for three schemes are given as follows: 
1. PA_NBD (Procurement Auction with No Bidder Drop): 
basic procurement auction (first price sealed bid reverse 
auction) with no possibility of bidders dropping out of 
auction over time.  
2. PA_BD (Procurement Auction with Bidder Drop): basic 
procurement auction, where bidders are allowed to drop out 
of auction at any time (based on some predefined bidder 
drop-out threshold) 
3. RPA_BD (Relationship Preserving Auction with Bidder 
Drop): our proposed Relationship Preserving Auction, 
where bidders are also allowed to drop out of auction at any 
time. 
Note that PA_NBD is used only as a benchmark to obtain lower 
bound of auctioneer’s total procurement cost, since no bidder drop 
in this repeated auction market is unrealistic. 
The experiment auction platform is implemented in Java and run 
on a 2GHz PC with 1GB RAM. 
 
5.2 Experiment Settings   
To design a realistic experiment, we have conducted an empirical 
study from IMK to derive the parameters of data generation 
model. 
 
5.2.1 Auctioneer Settings  
One auction experiment case includes 30 repeated auctions as one 
procurement time horizon. Each auction will declare a single 
winner. The auction amounts are assumed as equal for all auctions. 
The Price Competitiveness (PC) transfer function: f(bij) is defined 
as below; 
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The turning point price of 10 is selected arbitrarily compared to 
all the bidders bidding price range from the bidders settings.  
 
5.2.2 Bidders Settings 
Under the first price rule, if a bidder bids his cost, he earns zero 
profit and also forfeits the opportunity of profiting from 
subsequent markets. Hence bidders will markup their bids 
opportunistically, recognizing that, if they win, it can be more 
profitable (Hao 2000).  Hao (2000) presented key factors 
affecting an opportunistic bidding strategy: the cost distribution of 
all bidders, market demand, and the number of bidders 
participating in the auction. Since information on competing 
bidders’ cost distribution and the exact market demand are hard to 
come by, we do not assume such information is available. We do 
however assume that the number of participants is revealed to 
bidder just like other auction studies (Harstad et al. 1990). Based 
on given information and bidder’s own information about its cost 
and performance in previous auctions, we create bidder i’s 
bidding price in auction j, as follows: 
 
Equation (2):  )}
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Where cij is bidder i’s cost for the item in the auction j, m 
represents the number of auctions in the time horizon, and nj is the 
number of participants in auction j. In this experiment, we assume 
that every bidder’s bidding prices are generated from equation (2) 
with different cost and coefficient (γ) values. 
Equation (2) means that bidders generate their bidding price based 
on the number of wins so far as well as the number of participants 
in current auction. This bidding generation method is rational and 
intuitive. If bidders keep winning in the auctions, they will tend to 
increase the bidding price, because they gather that their bidding 
price is quite competitive, vice versa. Hence, we use the term 
Wij/m in equation (2).  
And if the number of participants is relatively small, which means 
it is a less competitive environment, bidders will bid more 
aggressively. 1/nj in (2) represents this effect in generating 
bidding price.  
γ is the coefficient that controls the level of bidder’s opportunism 
in generating bidding price. For the experiments, we set γ from 
 
0.1 to 0.5. Hence, possible bidding price for bidder i is higher 
than cost and less than twice of the cost. 
We assume that each bidder has different cost structure based on 
its production volume and competency in the market. Further 
more the cost changes along time period and the range is also 
different among bidders. The bidder i’s cost in auction j (cij) is 
randomly generated over a uniform distribution within the range 
as follows: bidder 1: [7,9], 2:[8,10], 3:[8,11], 4:[8,11], 5:[9,11], 
6:[9,12], 7:[10,13]. Bidder with lower number has less cost than 
bidder with higher number.  
We define the bidder drop-out threshold as the maximum number 
of consecutive losses (i.e. no wins) bidders experience before 
dropping out of the auction. The drop-out threshold of each bidder 
is uniformly distributed over the range [6, 10] during one auction 
case with 30 repeated auctions. For PA_NBD, this value is simply 
set to be larger than the number of auctions. 
For each experiment set, we generated 30 different auction 
experiment cases. Our experiments proceed and show the results 
as follows in section 5.3. First, we conduct experiments to find 
optimal value for the coefficients α and β in the given settings. 
Based on the results, we compare three different auction 
mechanisms in terms of average total cost of procurement for 
auctioneer and average number of remaining bidders in the last 
auction from the experiment set. We investigate further how 
RPA_BD reduce total procurement cost in repeated auctions. This 
is followed by experiments results under specific bidders’ bidding 
behavior allowing us to conclude with precise conditions which 
RPA_BD performs well. In section 5.4, we summarize the 
experiment results and discussions.   
 
5.3 Experiment Results 
5.3.1 Optimal Value for the Coefficient   
The coefficient α in equation (1) controls the value of Wij and its 
value is always negative in order to give higher chances to bidders 
who have won relatively less frequently. Note that the more 
negative the value of α, the higher impact of Wij on the 
relationship score, and consequently the more bidders (including 
less competitive bidders) will be maintained in the system, and 
vice versa. We set β as 0.5 and test the effect of α on the average 
total cost of procurement. The value of α is selected within [-3, 0] 
and Figure 4 shows the results. 
 
Figure 4. Optimal value of α  
 
As α decreases from -0.5, the average total cost increase by 
maintaining larger number of bidders including less competitive 
bidders. If α is smaller than -2, there is no much change in terms 
of average total cost and number of remaining bidders. When α is 
bigger than -0.5, the average total cost also increase because only 
few number of bidders remain. The average total cost has lowest 
value when α is -0.5.  Hence, we set the optimal α value as -0.5 in 
this experiment.  
β is the coefficient used in winner determine process - it 
represents the weight for current bidding price while (1- β) is for 
relationship score. We compare the results of RPA_BD and 
PA_BD through various β values from 0 to 1 by setting α as -0.5.  
 
Figure 5. Optimal value of β 
 
When β =1, the result of RPA_BD is as same as PA_BD because 
only bidding price is considered in winner determination. 
RPA_BD obtains lowest average total cost where β=0.75. If β 
decrease from 0.75, the average total cost increasing by keeping 
more bidders. That means, there is a chance to keep too many 
bidders including less competitive bidders if we give more weight 
to relationship score in winner determination process. In this 
auction experiment, we set the optimal β value as 0.75. 
 
5.3.2 Comparison Results 
In this section, we compare three different auction mechanisms 
based on generated experiment data where α= -0.5 and β=0.75. 
Table 1 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 1. Comparison results 
PA_NBD PA_BD PRA_BD 
No. of 
Remaining 
Bidders 
Avg. 
Total 
Cost 
No. of 
Remaining 
Bidders 
Avg. 
Total 
Cost 
No. of 
Remaining 
Bidders 
Avg. 
Total 
Cost 
7 262.37 1.83 289.73 3.23 278.62 
 
PA_NBD provides the lower bound of average total cost. Average 
total cost from RPA_BD is 5.8% higher than PA_NBD. Between 
RPA_BD and PA_BD, RPA_BD saves average total cost by 4% 
compared to PA_BD. 4% cost saving from one item procurement 
has huge impact on procurement outsourcing company. RPA_BD 
can save average total cost keeping enough number of bidders for 
 
competitive bidding price to the last auction. Number of 
remaining bidders from RPA_BA (3.23) is larger than from 
PA_BD (1.83).  
We further investigate the reasons for the difference between 
RPA_BD and PA_BD. According to our proposed mechanism, 
RPA_BD gives more chances to win for relatively competitive 
bidders efficiently and maintaining enough bidders for 
competitive bidding price until last auction. On the contrary, only 
few bidders win the most auctions in PA_BD and they will 
increase their price after other bidders dropped out of the auction. 
Eventually, only few bidders take most benefits from auction and 
auctioneer pays more eventually. To verify this argument, we 
compare number of wins of each bidders and Figure 6 shows the 
winning distribution among 7 bidders through 30 experiment 
cases.  
 
Figure 6. Winning distribution: RPA_BD vs. PA_BD 
 
As we expected, RPA_BD gives a higher chance to the bidders 
efficiently according to their bidding competitiveness. Bidders 
with lower number have less cost and they bid more 
competitively based on bidding price generation method. From 
the Figure 6, our mechanism allocate winner efficiently based on 
bidders’ bidding competitiveness. In PA_BD, most of wins are 
allocated to the small number of bidders and it will increase the 
auctioneer’s procurement cost. By analyzing the winning price at 
each auction between RPA_BD and PA_BD, we can show more 
clearly why RPA_BD decrease the auctioneer’s procurement cost 
compared to RA_BD. Figure 7 depicts the winning price along 30 
repeated auctions in one particular experiment case where each 
bidder’s drop-out threshold is set 7,9,9,10,9,7,6 respectively. 
 
Figure 7. Winning price distribution: RPA_BD vs. PA_BD 
 
In earlier auctions, the winning price from PA_BD is less than 
RPA_BD. However, after certain number of auctions, the winning 
price of PA_BD keeps increasing because a small number of 
remaining bidders bid opportunistically according to the bidding 
price generation method. On the contrary, the winning price from 
RPA_BD is consistent with a larger number of bidders retained 
until last auction. PA_BD retains two bidders, while 4 bidders 
remain  in RPA_BD.  
 
5.3.3 Under Different Bidding Behavior: Bidding 
Price Generation 
In this section, we compare the auction schemes with different 
levels of opportunism (γ) in biding price generation. Note that the 
higher γ value means bidders bid more aggressively as the 
opportunity for winning increases. That means it will increase the 
total cost of procurement for the auctioneer eventually. We 
assume that all bidders have equal  γ value within each 
experiment set, and we test 5 different γ values such as 0.1, 0.2, 
0.3, 0.4, 0.5 respectively. Figures 8 and 9 show the results. 
 
Figure 8. Average total cost vs value of γ 
 
 
Figure 9. Number of remaining bidders vs γ  
 
As the γ value increases beyond a certain point, the average total 
cost derived from RPA_BD becomes less than PA_BD. That 
means, RPA_BD performs better when bidders bid more 
opportunistically as the opportunity of winning increases.  
 
 
 
 
5.3.4 Under Different Bidding Behavior: Drop-out 
Behavior 
We compare the average total cost and number of remaining 
bidders based on the effects of different drop-out thresholds. We 
assign the same drop-out threshold for 7 bidders that range from 3 
to 30. We compare RPA_BD and PA_BD in different bidder 
drop-out thresholds and Figures 10 and 11 summarize the results 
in terms of the two evaluation criteria.  
 
Figure 10. Average total cost vs Drop-out threshold 
 
Figure 11. Number of remaining bidders vs Drop-out threshold 
 
After the drop-out threshold of 12, PA_BD produce less average 
total procurement cost than RPA_BD. By increasing the drop-out 
threshold, the number of remaining bidders increase and it affects 
the bidding price finally. From this result, we can conclude that if 
bidders are less likely to drop out of the auction market, there is 
less need to use RPA_BD to maintain more bidders. Hence, 
RPA_BD works well in auction markets where the participating 
bidders are readily to quit the market if they keep losing. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
From the above experiments, we conclude that our RPA_BD 
mechanism works well under specific conditions in which 
participants exhibit certain level of opportunistic bidding behavior 
and bidders readily drop out of the auction after a certain number 
of consecutive losses. RPA_BD keeps enough bidders by giving 
more chance to relatively competitive bidders and bidders will bid 
competitively until the last auction. Eventually, it decreases the 
procurement cost of auctioneer in our experiments. 
We believe that using our proposed auction mechanism will be 
beneficial to the procurement outsourcing company which deals 
with standardized products where there are many suppliers and 
many parallel markets, where suppliers are loosely coupled with 
the auctioneer in the sense that they can renege and move to other 
markets if the current market is not profitable. Such markets are 
becoming very common with the increasing popularity of online 
auctions (Jap 2002).  
  
 6. CONCLUSION 
E-procurement auction has become a dominant procurement 
strategy in many industries. While the adoption of e-procurement 
auction has helped firms to obtain lower cost procurements, it has 
also raised important issues related to maintaining long-term 
relationships with the partners, especially in a repeated e-
procurement context. In this paper, we proposed the notion of 
Relationship Preserving Auction which we realize through a 
relationship scoring model. Our experiments show that our 
approach can perform better than typical procurement auctions in 
repeated auctions under specific conditions - where bidders bid 
opportunistically and quite the auction market readily after certain 
number of consecutive losses. RPA_BD achieve these results 
from keeping enough bidders by giving more chance to relatively 
competitive bidders. Bidders will bid competitively until the last 
auction and it decreases the procurement cost of auctioneer in our 
experiments eventually. 
However, findings from our experiments are based on several 
assumptions and simplification. One extension from our work is  
further investigations on bidders’ bidding behaviors in real 
procurement auctions. Another aspect of our approach is that it 
deals with a closed set of bidders, and does not allow entrance of 
new bidders throughout the time horizon. An interesting extension 
is to hence deal with a dynamic setting where bidders can join and 
leave the system. 
This paper focuses on the auction setting for a single item with 
single winner. An open research topic is to consider multiple 
items with multiple units. One approach is to decompose  into 
multiple simultaneous auctions, so long as the items are not 
combinatorial in nature. Even if they are, our approach still works 
if we extend our proposed winner determination algorithm to 
handle combinatorial auctions.  
We also recognize the need to consider not only competitiveness 
of bidding price but also bidder’s quality such as product quality, 
delivery accuracy to generate more complete relationship in 
further studies.  
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